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Does Probability Collapse or Retroact? 
1, Probability of the Past Event 
Masaki ICHINOSE 
(The University of Tokyo) 
It is sometimes questioned, as C. S. Peirce once doubted1, whether 
decision-makings based upon probability can be justified as rational or not. 
Even though, for example, we choose the option as the most rational one 
whose expected probabilistic utility was the highest, an unexpected event 
whose probability was very low might result as a matter of fact. In that 
case, did we make the rational decision? If you say we did, our reason 
seems to be useless. 2 
I think here is a deep philosophical question concerning rationality, 
but what I will focus my attention upon this time by referring to this 
question is not the question about rationality itself, but the hidden 
intuitive idea that happens to appear in the above question. That is to 
say, the value of probability must be suddenly fixed as 1 or 0 the moment 
the event the probability was attributed has been actualized or failed to be 
so. The question above picks up the case that an event was attributed low 
probability, nonetheless the event actually happened. Then it was 
doubted why the decision from probability can be called 'rational decision', 
if we judge backwards after the occurrence of the less probabilistic event. 
Obviously, behind this question there must be the idea that, as soon as the 
less probabilistic event has happened, the event is no longer less 
probabilistic, but has been already fixed with the maximum probability, 
namely, probability 1. Otherwise the result of the decision would remain 
still pending, so we can't denounce the decision as irrational. As it were, 
the situation is suddenly reversed and then settled, which the decision 
couldn't follow despite being imposed to follow as far as it professes itself to 
be 'rational decision'. Of course, if some model of kinematics of 
probability is adopted like Jeffrey's classic theory3, then the change at that 
moment might not be sudden. Nevertheless, even in that case, the 
situation is the same, since there happens a decisive leap from uncertainty 
to certainty the moment the event concerned has occurred. Rather, I 
suspect that a high probability just before the final moment in such 
1 Peirce (1986), pp.281-2. 
2 David Papineau presented the same question when he talked at the philosophy of 
science speakers series in the University of Oxford on 31 October 2002 under the title of 
'Decisions in a No-Collapse Universe'. He examined the orthodoxy of decision theory 
that appeals to the notion of expected probabilistic utility, compared with Everettian 
view of many worlds, and said that the principle of expected probabilistic utility might 
lead to an actual unexpected result, notwithstanding that the actual result crucially 
matters in decision theory. 
3 Cf., Jeffrey (1983), chapter 11. 
19 
kinematics can be assigned retrospectively only after the event concerned 
has actually occurred. Anyway, thus, some people suspect that the 
principle of maximizing expected probabilistic utility might not be rational, 
taking into account the case that an unexpected result has been actualized, 
namely, the probability of expected result has been fixed as O. We can 
paraphrase this idea into the next claim that I want to call the Principle of 
Probability of the Past Event (PPE); 
(PPE) As soon as an event is recognized as just now HAPPENED in a 
specified way, the probability of its occurrence must be 1, at least 
as far as the probability of single event is concerned4 . 
In fact, David Lewis clearly declares this intuitive idea, by saying, 'What's 
past is no longer chancy. The past, unlike the future, has no chance of 
being any other way than the way it actually is'5. Is there anything more 
self-evident than the idea that the probability of the event already having 
happened is I? It is true that probability 1 is usually introduced as 
applying to logical tautology according to Kolmogorov's axiom like, for 
example, 'P(t) = 1 if tis a tautology6', but this suggests that being tautology 
is only a sufficient condition for probability1. This means that there could 
be another case which is assigned probability 1. That is precisely the case 
of the past event having just happened. This seems to be an intuitive idea. 
Or, in other words, we might say that, when we have the intuitive idea, we 
actually committed ourselves to such a sort of tautology as 'what has 
happened has happened,' thus the probability 1 of past events could be 
subsumed in Kolmogorov's axiom. In any case, the crucial point of PPE is 
that, although probability of an event is clearly lower than 1 before 
recognition, its probability suddenly rises to 1 as soon as we recognize the 
event. PPE is typically illustrated, for instance, by this situation; 
probability of the event that the lightening strikes me is lower than 1 
before the event occurs, nevertheless its probability leaps to 1 the moment 
I am actually struck by the lightening. Who could believe otherwise? I 
think that this intuitive idea is universally true of the concept of 
probability, no matter what interpretation of probability is taken, unless 
the notion of the probability of single event is excluded as in the case of 
Von Mises' version of the frequency interpretation. 
In reality, PPE is clearly confirmed by two major interpretations of 
probability, i.e. the propensity theory (in an original Popper's sense in 
order to make sense of single event's probability) and the epistemic 
(including subjective and interpersonal) interpretation. If we adopt the 
propensity theory, there is no doubt that we have to assign probability 1 to 
4 For the time being, I don't search the question of what the bearer of probability is, by 
roughly taking both the event and the sentence 'the event happens' to be equally the 
bearer, since my argument would not seem to be influenced by the question. 
5 Lewis (1986), p.93 . 
6 Howson & Urbach (1993), p.21. 
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an event if we actually just observed it happen. What else could we do? In 
reality, this point is conjoined with quantum mechanics that motivated 
Popper to propose the propensity theory, which I shall discuss later. Also 
that must be true of the epistemic interpretation, apparently. When we 
find something just now actually appear in front of me, we automatically 
accept that the sentence, 'the thing has occurred, ' is completely true as far 
as my epistemic understanding is concerned, apart from philosophical 
problems of illusion or 'theory-laden.' In that sense I said that PPE is 
universally true. As a matter of fact, Bayesian epistemology, which is 
based upon epistemic probability, basically presupposes that evidence gets 
probability 1 when it is actually observed7• Of course, I am fully conscious 
that there is a crucial difference between the propensity theory and the 
epistemic interpretation, i.e. the former concerns an event itself and the 
latter the degree of belief. But, at least, that difference can be virtually 
ignored as regards the case of probability 1 in PPE. 
However, what should we think about the past event that is 
unrecognized? I think that there are two cases of unrecognized past 
events. The first one is the past event that is not recognized at all but 
merely supposed to have happened in an unspecified or vague way 
regarding space and time, for example, an event that something existed 
before the earth was born. PPE avoids mentioning this kind of 
unrecognized past events. Certainly, if we accept the propensity theory, 
even events that we don't recognized at all but just generally suppose to 
have happened might be assigned probability 1. But, on the contrary, 
since it is supposed in an unspecified way, it seems to be impossible to 
individuate a particular event as a bearer of probability. It's hard to see 
what probability we are talking about. Then, what if we adopt an 
epistemic interpretation? Perhaps, even from such interpretation, we 
7 Here I have to refer to the case in which we can't give probability 1 to a sentence, '8 is 
P ,' despite actually observing the phenomenon right now. This situation with 
uncertain evidence was initially noticed by Richard Jeffrey. He gives such an example 
that; the agent inspects a piece of cloth by candlelight, and gets the impression that it is 
green, although he concedes that it might be blue or even (but very improbably) violet . 
Thus, he proposes a conditionalisation to formulate posterior probability of a hypothesis 
in such cases. This is his formulation (which I modify a bit to make it clearer), 
This is called Jeffrey Condition8lis8tion (in which Ppri means prior probability and Ppos 
posterior probability) . Jeffrey claims that this is not different from usual B8yesi8n 
Condition8iis8tion, since both conditionalisations will be the same when Ppos(e) = 1 can 
be affirmed. See Jeffrey (1983), pp.164-172. Well, then, how should we think of PPE in 
this case? The event to be considered by PPE in this case is the one that the cloth is lit 
by candlelight. When an event is observed, there could be many sentences to describe 
the observation, but the fact that the event is observed is determinate. As far as such 
determinate fact is concerned, probability 1 could be assigned. Actually, Jeffrey 
Conditionalisation can't start without probability 1 in this sense, which is 
corresponding to probability 1 of (Ppos(e) + ppos( "-e) = 1) . 
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might claim that some past events, even if not specifically recognized, 
surely happened in an abstract sense, so can be given probability 1. Maybe 
those who have personal religious faith might have such claim if it's 
particularly concerned with their faith. But, the most honest comment 
about the claim is that we are not certain about that. Therefore, I made 
PPE not touch those cases. The second case is the past event that is not 
recognized but represented in a specified way, for instance, an event that a 
newspaper was on the desk in my room at 4:00 pm yesterday (provided 
that it was not recognized at that time). I want PPE to claim that the 
probability of such event must be smaller than 1. This must be another 
implication of PPE. Otherwise, PPE wouldn't imply the sudden change of 
probability at the moment of recognition. In fact, if we choose the 
epistemic interpretation, we must give smaller probability than 1 to such 
kind of event, because the event is not an actual one but just an uncertain 
imaginary, at most inferred, one. But, what if we accept the propensity 
theory? It's independent of our belief, so the event has probability 1 if it 
really happened despite being not known by us. My idea is that; as far as 
the propensity theory comes from quantum physics, it is not completely 
unreasonable for us to assign smaller probability than 1 to such kind of 
event if we take into account the measurement problem in quantum 
mechanics. This idea might sound very weird, but I think that we can 
make sense of the idea by reflecting on both Popper's argument of 
propensity and the concept of past in connection with probability, which I 
shall try later. 
Anyway, here I will examine PPE thus formulated, in order to 
understand the concept of probability as clearly as I could. Perhaps, my 
argument will be just hypothetical or thought-experimental, but all that I 
intend to do is to take a step forward. 
2, Mysteries of Probability 1 
Honestly speaking, it has been my longtime question, what is 
probability I? Because probability 1 seems to be too self-evident, nobody 
seriously tried to explain what it is, as long as I know. But, apparently, 
probability 1 is very problematic. I can instantly raise at least three basic 
difficulties about it, that is to say, MODAL, TEMPORAL, and CAUSAL 
difficulties. First, I can pick out the MODAL difficulty about probability 1. 
Probability 1 is intuitively applied to the past event that has been 
actualized, as in PPE. But, undoubtedly, as I've mentioned, it is also 
applied to logical tautology or necessary truth like 'that dog is male or not.' 
In other words, probability 1 is connected with two fundamental modal 
concepts, namely, actuality and necessity. But, a difficulty seems to arise, 
particularly from the side of necessity. If the probability of necessary truth 
is 1, the probability of non -necessary, contingent sentence must be smaller 
than 1. I think that this is an implication of accepting necessary truth as 
having probability 1. This is easy to understand if we imagine the case of 
prediction. Let's think of those two prediction sentences (suppose that it 
is January 2005 now); 
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A: Tony Blair either resigns or doesn't resign from British Prime 
Minister in April 2005. 
B: Tony Blair resigns from British Prime Minister in April 2005. 
I adopt the standard notation about probability, i.e. P(A) means the 
probability of the occurrence of event-A or the probability of the truth of 
sentence-A. Then, obviously, P(A) = 1 since A is a logical necessary truth, 
while P(B) < 1 because it is not necessary but contingent. Nevertheless, if 
Tony Blair actually resigns from British Prime Minister in April 2005, it 
suddenly comes to that P(B) = 1 because it is an actuality, although B still 
remains just a contingent truth. But, nevertheless again, even after B is 
actualized, we can say that still P(B) < 1 in the sense that we are not 
necessarily in the possible world in which B is true if we adopt some simple 
possible world semantics to explain modal concepts. Thus, P(B) < 1 & 
P(B) = 1, which is a manifest contradiction, at least at first sight. Perhaps 
a similar difficulty doesn't arise if we start from the side of actuality, since 
actuality might extensionally include necessity. Well, in any case, I think 
that the contradiction thus produced over necessity is one of the basic 
difficulties concerning probability 1. Probably, in order to confront this 
difficulty, the first thing we should do is to consider how modal concepts 
are understood if the time, or finally the tense, is taken into account. In 
addition, there is another difficulty which is more closely related to PPE. 
If we focus upon the problem about the relation between PPE and actuality, 
and recognize that the event already actualized in the past is given 
probability 1, then we are treating actuality as in the past. So, what 
about actuality in the present? How is the past actuality related to the 
present actuality? I believe that this question, which again attempts to 
cross modal concepts and the tense, is also to be seriously taken in 
connection with the problem of probability 18. 
Second, we have to mention the TEMPORAL difficulty with respect 
to probability 1. Even though we easily accept PPE, namely, the idea that 
probability of the event just having happened must be 1, it can be 
questioned whether the probability of the event will remain 1 permanently 
hereafter or not. In other words, we have to ask whether probability 1 is 
temporally immutable or not after it is established. This question deeply 
concerns in a rather perplexed way both the ontological status of 
probability and the metaphysical significance of the past. Is probability a 
sort of natural property inhering in reality, or just a concept functioning in 
our thoughts? Does the past eternally persist, or change and vanish as 
8 It is often said that probability is contrasted with certainty. However, exactly 
speaking, it is not true, of course, because probability covers both certainty and 
uncertainty. If P=l , probability is equivalent to certainty, and if P<l , probability can 
be take as uncertainty. Well, can we think that the very certainty must be the 
essential feature of probability 1 in common to actuality and necessity? I believe that 
we can't think so easily, since, as far as I understand, actuality and necessity are 
typical modal concepts, while certainty is an epistemic concept. 
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time goes by? There is no room here to develop some arguments about 
those questions in detail, but, for the time being, I have one thing to affirm; 
as a matter of fact, we sometimes take probability to be a natural property, 
and sometimes to be just a sort of mental state, and similarly, we 
sometimes regard the past as eternally existing in a fixed way, and 
sometimes as only appearing in our memory. Indeed, if probability isn't 
understood in such a flexible manner, it is difficult to explain why 
probability is actually working in quantum mechanics as well as our action 
of betting on horse racing. This might be also suggested by the fact that 
pluralism is often proposed with regard to the interpretation of 
probability9. As to the past, on the one hand, we firmly believe that the 
past is already fixed and we can't change that, but, on the other hand, we 
think that we can't ascertain the past truly and sometimes doubt the past 
by saying that it's shrouded in a mystery. If that is the case, we could 
safely say that the event in the past will gradually reduce its probability 
from 1 to smaller than I, even though we accept PPE. Why is this? 
Because we might forget the past event. As far as there is an epistemic 
aspects of probability and there is an idea of the past as memory, it is not 
inconsistent with our ordinary concepts of probability and past to introduce 
the factor of forgetting about probability 1. Timothy Williamson grasps 
the situation of PPE as the case of evidential probability I , and, as 
correctly as usual, rejects the next claim he calls MONOTONICITY by 
taking into account the factor of forgetting; 
(MONOTONICITY) Once a proposition has evidential probability I , it 
keeps it thereafter lO• 
Williamson reaches the rejection of (MONOTONICITY) through his firm 
idea of the higher'order probability of the propositions about the evidential 
probability. This is an insightful argument certainly, but at the same 
time, it clearly indicates an embarrassing situation as regards probability 
I , since it somehow compromises PPE, and perhaps challenges the 
immutability of the past (maybe with an anti'realistic flavour)ll . In any 
9 For example, Cohen and Gillies clearly propose the pluralism of the interpretation of 
probability. See Cohen (1989) and Gillies (2000). Incidentally, I myself don't side 
with pluralism. It is true that several interpretations of probability are actually 
working, depending upon contexts, but it's just a fact. We have to question whether 
there is some more fundamental moment that penetrates into all of those 
interpretations, for example, as regards our practical actions in using probability 
concepts , or their relationship with the tense concepts. Hopefully, this article is meant 
to be one of such attempts as consider the fundamental moment in common to all 
interpretations of probability. 
10 Williamson (2000) , p .218 ff. 
11 I personally asked Timothy Williamson in April 2003 whether his strategy of 
rejecting MONOTONICITY might lead to anti-realism about the past or not . He 
instantly answered that his standpoint is not an anti-realism in a Dummett's sense. 
Of course, it is not . This problem depends upon whether values of probability should 
be thought to be subsumed in the concept of past as its inseparable component. If it's 
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case, we have to say that this situation is one of the natural implications 
about probability 1. Thus, here is also a serious difficulty we must face 12. 
Third, we have to confront the CAUSAL difficulty concerning 
probability 1. The situation which strikingly appears when we accept 
PPE is that probability is suddenly changed into 1 once the event 
concerned becomes past. This is remarkably represented by the case that 
some highly uncertain prediction comes true. For instance, suppose that 
the probability of the proposition, 'I win this lottery,' is estimated at 0.001, 
and then I actually win. In this case, the moment the number of my 
lottery is selected, the probability instantaneously rise from 0.001 to 1. 
Isn't there some problem here? Few people have put this situation in 
question so far. But, can we accept this sudden change of probability as a 
perfectly unproblematic phenomenon that needs no explanation? I don't 
think so. The change is often very dramatic and drastic as in the case 
above, so it seems to be very natural to ask why this happens. In fact, we 
human being has been developing scientific knowledge by observing 
conspicuous changes in physical phenomena and asking why or how they 
change. I think that, in asking such questions, we usually look for causal 
relations among phenomena. Therefore, I also want to propose this 
causal question in this context, i.e. what causes this sudden change of 
probability from smaller than 1 to I? This is the third basic difficulty 
with regard to probability 1, which seems to be extremely hard to answer. 
3, The Collapse of Probability 
Now, then, which is the most noteworthy difficulty we must face first 
of those three ones? Obviously the modal difficulty should be discussed 
from the metaphysical or logical point of view, and the temporal difficulty 
has to be examined from the epistemic or epistemological standpoint. 
What about the causal difficulty? I think that the causal problems in 
general span all fields of philosophical topics including metaphysical and 
epistemic problems, therefore it seems to be very convenient to focus our 
attention first upon the causal difficulty, whose examination might suggest 
some promising routes towards some appropriate understanding of other 
two difficulties13. Furthermore, it is not only convenient but also crucial 
so subsumed, the rejection of MONOTONICITY might reach the idea of changing the 
past in a literal sense. But, if probability values are just some numbers externally 
attached to the past, this problem has nothing to do with any anti·realism. 
12 David Hume once proposed the similar problem to this second difficulty in the 
chapter entitled 'Of unphilosophical probability' of his Treatise. He points out the fact 
that all of our knowledge whatsoever must become less probable as the time passes, 
because our memory gets fainter and fainter. It is a very interesting argument and 
can't be ignored, but I am afraid that this argument would be applied to philosophers' 
own assertions in a self-destructive manner. This devastating point might be true of 
my second difficulty as regards probability 1. Cf. Hume (1978), pp.143-155. 
13 Someone might wonder how the causal difficulty is related to the modal difficulty. 
But, is it nonsense to question how necessity or actuality is caused? I don't think so. 
In fact, for example, a certain type of the causal theory of time as Michael Tooley 
develops explains actuality in terms of causal process. Even logical necessity, as long 
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to scrutinize the causal difficulty first, since other two difficulties could 
arise only by taking it for granted that something having probability 1 
already existed, whereas the causal difficulty brings into question how 
probability 1 appears, or what the process of something's getting 
probability 1 is. The causal difficulty is the most basic, so it must be 
questioned first. That question is my very aim this time. 
I must mention one point before examining the causal difficulty. 
That is to say, there can be a philosophical problem concerning which 
notion is more basic, probability or causality. It is well known that some 
people try to understand causality by appealing to the notion of probability. 
That is called Probabilistic Causality, whose main idea is to define the 
concept of cause as raising the probability of its effect14. Obviously, the 
theory of probabilistic causality requires the notion of probability to be 
prior to causality. However, on the contrary, the causal difficulty that I 
propose here about probability 1 can make sense only provided that 
causality is more primitive than probability, since the difficulty questions 
what the cause of probability 1 is. How can we reconcile this situation? I 
want to say; this situation doesn't have to be reconciled in advance. Both 
probability and causality are so extremely fundamental that it is very 
natural for them to be entangled with each other. 
In fact, even if we find the cause of probability 1, there is still room for 
the cause itself of probability to work in a (higher-ordered) probabilistic 
way. The similar situation is likewise true of the side of probabilistic 
causality. For example, it is well known that Ramsey develops his 
elaborate subjective theory of probability based upon the supposed relation 
as we take it as one of our (metaphysical) notions, could be questioned as regards its 
causal status. I think that metaphysical problems have more to do with causality than 
we usually expect (Cf., Tooley 1997). But, certainly it is difficult to understand the 
relation between PPE and probability 1 of logical necessity. All that I can do about 
this tentatively is to propose another principle parallel to PPE, and then to suggest the 
relation of both principles. The another principle, which can be called the Principle of 
Probability of Necessary Truth (PNT), is like this; 
(PNT) As soon as a sentence is regarded as NECESSARY truth, its probability must 
be 1. 
If we can formulate the case of probability 1 about necessary truth by PNT, we might 
say that probability 1 of necessity is subsumed under PPE, because our regarding the 
sentence as necessary is also temporally made, so it is factually equivalent to having 
ALREADY regarded it as necessary. Of course, then, we have to ask those two 
questions, namely, (1) was the probability of the sentence smaller than 1 before our 
regarding it as so? (2) is the probability 1 of logical necessary truth changeable in the 
future? As to (0, I think that, as soon as we regard the sentence as logically necessary, 
we extend the necessity to the past, as it were retrospectively, by taking the necessity to 
obtain timelessly. Thus, it seems to me that concepts of necessity and past have a 
close affinity to each other. But, what about the future? If it's necessary timelessly, 
won't it be permanently necessary even in the future? This question leads to (2), 
which is, as you easily perceive, nothing but the temporal difficulty I called. 
14 Cf., Eells (1991), p.1, and MelIor (1995), p.67. 
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between belief/desire and action. And, he regarded the relation as causal15. 
If so, and we propose the theory of probabilistic causality by appealing to 
the subjective interpretation of probability, then we must fall into 
circularity. Of course, some people believe the effectiveness of the idea of 
probabilistic causality and try to make the idea more acceptable and 
plausible. Papineau, for instance, attempts to make up a more exquisite 
theory of probabilistic causality through replacing the idea of the 
screening-off asymmetry, which is usually used to decide the direction of 
causation in the theory of probabilistic causality, with another new 
requirement. That is, 'the requirement that effects should have 
probabilistically independent causes.l6' But, then, what is 'probabilistically 
independent'? According to Howson and Urbach, two sentences, hl and h2, 
are called probabilistically independent iff P(hl & h2) = P(hl) P(h2)17, which 
leads to that P(hl I h2) = P(hl) in terms of the definition of conditional 
probability. Is this nothing but that the probability of changing in 
connection with other factors is 0, in other words, the probability of 
remaining the same despite changes of other factors is I? Thus, 
elaborating the theory of probabilistic causality induces us to ask what 
probability 1 is, and eventually to run into the causal difficulty about 
probability 1. Probability and causality are so bewilderingly tangled in an 
intrinsic sense. Therefore, I defer the reconciliation of those two basic 
concepts until the end of this article, for my article itself is an attempt to 
consider the relation between probability and causality. 
Well, then, how could we cope with the question, 'what causes the 
sudden change of probability from smaller than 1 to I?' Perhaps, one of 
possible answers, which can be easily thought of, is that the time itself, in 
particular the present itself, causes the sudden change of probability. But, 
this is too implausible to be instantly adopted. First, this view represents 
the time as a sort of real existence or substance with causal efficacy, which 
can be supported only by some peculiar metaphysics, so everyone is not 
convinced of it. Second, if we acknowledge that the time causes the 
sudden change of probability, then there might be a possibility that any 
change in our world must be said to be produced by the time, consequently, 
this view would have no explanatory power. Then, how should I answer 
next? Obviously, the crucial point is how it is established that the event 
has happened. A simple answer is that ; it is the very fact that it just 
happened and went away into the past, which needn't be elucidated 
further more. But, I am afraid this line of thought might come back again 
finally to the previous implausible view that the time itself causes the 
sudden change, because this simple answer eventually appeals only to the 
change of the tense in order to explain the sudden change of probability . . 
This is just a refusal of investigation, which doesn't seem to be 
philosophical. 
15 Ramsey (1990), p.65. 
16 Papineau (2001), p.28. 
17 Howson & Urbach (1993), p.4l. 
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Now, what is another possibility? A slight consideration enables us 
to remember an existing theory that explains the sudden change of 
probability into 1. That is what is called 'the collapse (or reduction) of the 
wave packet' in quantum mechanics. Mentioning this in this context is not 
inappropriate, since, as I said earlier, problematic phenomena coming from 
quantum mechanics are one of sources that produced a powerful 
interpretation of probability, namely, the propensity theory. Usually the 
propensity theory, in particular in an original form by Popper, is classified 
as the objective interpretation of probability, but, exactly speaking, such 
classification isn't necessarily true in spite of Popper's own intention if we 
consider his way of introducing the propensity theory in connection with 
quantum mechanics. I will discuss this point later. Anyway, as a matter 
of fact, apart from its purely mathematical notion, 'probability amplitudes', 
quantum mechanics itself doesn't always declare anything clear about how 
to interpret the concept of probability despite the fact that its main idea 
lies in the appeal to probability when describing the reality of nature. 
Hence it is sometimes seriously discussed in a philosophical context how 
we should interpret probability in quantum mechanics. IS Actually we 
could say, independently of Popper's context, that it is doubtful whether 
probability in quantum mechanics must be objective in a literal sense, 
because, taking into account the so-called measurement problem, we might 
even say that probability concept in quantum mechanics is subjective in a 
certain sense rather than objective (Popper seemed to recognize this 
situation, then propose the propensity theory by explicitly criticizing the 
situation). Therefore, I take up 'the collapse of the wave packet' as a 
material that can be universally applicable to the concept of probability, 
irrespective of what interpretation of probability to choose, as far as PPE is 
concernedl9 . Of course, to consider quantum mechanics in detail is not 
my intention here, so my argument in the following provisionally focuses 
upon the classical Copenhagen interpretation 20. I believe that this 
18 For instance, Michel Paty recently published his thoughts about it, and asserted that 
we should carefully distinguish two meanings of probability in quantum physics, i .e . 
theoretical (relational and mathematical) and empirical (in a statistical sense) 
meanings. See Paty (2001), pp.235-255. 
19 When I considered the relation between subjective interpretation and objective one 
of probability along quantum mechanics, I got some hints from Logue (1995). In 
addition, I had an opportunity to attend at Logue's lectures at Oxford in the spring of 
2003, which was entitled 'Philosophy of Probability and Induction'. I learnt a lot from 
his lecture, too. Here I express my gratitude to him. 
20 But, as far as I see, for example, even the manY'worlds approach would be also 
involved in another sort of the sudden change, because, if we observe quantum 
phenomena in a fixed way and recognize that we are in this particular world, then there 
is the sudden moving from one present world to another particular world, even if it 
might have nothing to do with probability concept as the Copenhagen interpretation 
deals with. This is confirmed by this Polkinghorne's description of the many-world 
approach; 'at every act of measurement, physical reality divides into a multiplicity of 
separate universes, in each of which different (cloned) experimenters observe the 
different possible outcomes of the measurement.' (Cr. Polkinghorne (2002), p.52). This 
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strategy wouldn't undermine my points which I'm going to propose as a 
kind of hypothesis or thought-experiment. 
Now, then, what is the collapse of wave packet? How does the 
probability suddenly change? How is that caused? It is enough here to 
reconfIrm only the basic points for my purpose. I call for the lucidly 
summarized expression of an authority. John Polkinghorne simply 
describes like this; 
Measurements must be occasions of instantaneous and discontinuous 
change. If an electron was in a state with probability spread out 'here', 
'there', and, perhaps, 'everywhere', when its position was measured was 
measured and found to be, on this occasion, 'here', then the probability 
distribution had suddenly to change, becoming concentrated solely on 
the actually measured position, 'here'. Since the probability distribution 
is to calculated from the wavefunction, this too must change 
discontinuously ...... This phenomenon of sudden change, called the 
collapse of the wavepacket21 ...... 
In addition, I quote the next Dirac's expression in order to confIrm clearly 
what the result of the collapse is; 
The state of the system after the observation must be an eigenstate of a, 
since the result of a measurement of a for this state must be a 
certain ty22. 
This argument is already well known of itself, and also well known for 
producing many perplexed difficulties in a philosophical sense as well as in 
a scientific sense, which are not to be argued here. Now, rather I want to 
ask, what causes the sudden change of probability into certainty? What 
causes the sudden change of probability from smaller than 1 to I? Well, 
as is suggested in the description above, measurement or observation must 
have something to do with this. Polkinghorne expressed that as 
'occasions ofinstantaneous and discontinuous change.' It sounds to be the 
way a classical occasionalist, Malebranche, talks. Undoubtedly, here is a 
very deep philosophical question about causality. According to Barret, 
Heisenberg 'must have meant that it was an observer's act of observation 
that then forced nature to make a particular choice'23. Yes, it is a 
reasonable and safe opinion to say that nature is the real cause of the 
sudden change. But, it's too safe to keep our ordinary concept of cause. 
approach contrived the way of avoiding using probability concepts crucially, but the 
structure is exactly parallel to the standard approach with regard to the sudden change. 
Perhaps we may ask likewise, what causes this sudden change? That question is 
precisely equivalent to the causal difficulty as I offered even if not using probability 
concepts . 
21 Polkinghorne (2002), pp.25-26. 
22 Dirac (1930), p.49. 
23 Barret (1999), p .26. 
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When I give a lethal injection to someone and the person die, it is not a 
mistake to say that nature is the cause of her death. Or, when I leave a 
burning match in the dustbin of a house and then the house burns, it is not 
a mistake either to say that the burning is caused by nature. Yet, nobody 
thinks that such excuses can make sense. Usually, a thing that is an 
occasion of other thing and without which the other thing doesn't happen is 
loosely called a cause of the other thing. As the history of philosophy 
proves, an attempt to strictly define the cause is either unsuccessful or 
vague of itself because of its looseness. In fact, Dirac declares in later 
years; 'a measurement always cause the system to jump into an eigenstate 
of the dynamical value that is being measured. 24' Thus, let's judge, 
hypothetically, that our measurement or observation is the very cause of 
the collapse of wave packet. I think there is nothing which can reject this 
judgment as entirely ridiculous. Actually I couldn't imagine another 
possibility at least in this context. 
Of course, strictly speaking, those argument concerns the collapse of 
wave packet, not the sudden change of probability itself. But, the concept 
of cause is actually very loose, intrinsically loose, therefore, if there is the 
co-extensional phenomena with a cause of some event, we may call the 
phenomena the cause of the event, too. This is applied to the case of the 
sudden change of wave packet and of probability, since both of sudden 
changes are clearly co-extensional. Thus, if it is our observation that 
causes the collapse of wave packet, then our observation is also regarded as 
the cause of the sudden change of probability. As it were, the collapse of 
probability happens here simultaneously with that of wave packet, in the 
sense that probability distribution collapses and probability becomes 
concentrated solely on the actuality position, '1'. My assertion is that; the 
same situation is analogously true of the sudden change of probability in 
general as appears in PPE. Consequently, I propose the next thesis as a 
hypothesis, which I call 'the Collapse of Probability Hypothesis (CPH); 
(CPH) If PPE is true, then our observation CAUSES the probability of an 
event to collapse into the value 1 as soon as we observe the event 
pass away into the past25• 
Unless the time itself or the fact itself can be the cause of the sudden 
change of probability, I think that our observation is actually the only 
24 Dirac (1958), p.36. 
25 I refer not to the present but only to the past, because I think that the present is 
always perishing, so actually impossible to grasp as it is. Presentism, as Zimmerman 
tries to defend, seems to fatally ignore the empirical vanishing character of the present. 
Cr. Zimmerman (1998), pp.206-219. But, on the other hand, the concept of the past 
has its peculiar difficulty, namely, the past no longer exists, so, exactly speaking, it is 
fundamentally hard to understand what the truth -maker is about sentences in the past 
tense. This is one of traditional puzzles since Aristotle, which is definitely worthwhile 
examining further in another occasion. 
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plausible and explanatory candidate as the cause26 . There are infinite 
numbers of factors that can be theoretically the cause of the sudden change 
of probability depending on each case, but what I'm looking for is the cause 
that equally explains all cases. As far as PPE is accepted, our observation 
corresponding to the phrase in PPE, 'is recognized as', seems to be an only 
option as the cause. And, the sudden change of probability into 1 in PPE 
is remarkably similar to the case of the collapse of probability in quantum 
physics as regards the structures of their situations. Thus, I came to CPH. 
In fact, rather I want to suggest a bolder claim by reversing the order. 
That is to say, probability intrinsically collapses, therefore the collapse of 
wave packet and of probability in quantum mechanics is just one of natural 
consequences derived from the concept of probability in general. Probably, 
this claim could eliminate the seeming weirdness of my strategy of 
appealing to quantum mechanics which is highly controversial in itself, 
because my aim is to clarify the nature of probability in general by using 
quantum mechanics as just one possible gate to lead to the nature. I don't 
intend to at all, and needn't at all, found my argument upon quantum 
mechanics. 
4, Popper's Legacy 
It wouldn't go amiss to turn our eyes to Popper's argument now, or 
rather my argument thus far naturally induces us to do that, since CPH 
I've just reached is proposed basically through considering the significance 
of probability in quantum mechanics, which is precisely what Popper 
focused on when constructing his propensity theory of probability. 
Actually I have already mentioned Popper's propensity theory a couple of 
times, so I should determine my attitude towards his theory to a certain 
extent, which is so remarkable in the history of the philosophy of 
probability as to be called 'Popper's Legacy.' My argument would be 
reinforced, and the implication of CPH would be made more explicit, by 
looking back a bit over Popper's Legacy. 
What I hope to focus on first is that Popper offers this 
thought-experiment in the part entitled 'A Random Walk and the 
'Transition from the Possible to the Actual" in his Quantum Theory and 
the Schism in Physics, 
A soldier in the desert is given a pocket roulette-wheel and instructed to 
set it up, letting the pointer spin and come to rest, and then to march for 
one minute in the direction indicated by the pointer; and then to repeat 
the performance, letting the pointer spin again, and again marching for 
one minute in the direction of the pointer. It is at once intuitively clear . 
26 If we connect the notion of observation with the notion of self or spirit, this view 
might be regarded as one variant of Berkeley's classical standpoint. See, for example, 
Berkeley (1951), section 30. Incidentally, Berkeley was highly reassessed by Popper 
as one of pioneers of scientific instrumentalism that could be concerned with quantum 
mechanics. See Popper (1963), pp.97·119. 
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that, on the basis of this instruction, we obtain a probability distribution 
for the position of the soldier which spreads with the soldier's marching 
speed from the starting point in all directions -a kind of cloud which is 
dense in the centre and thins out towards its periphery ..... 
Now let us observe the soldier, after one hour, when he is just 
consulting his pocket roulette-wheel. Then, we may say, the old cloud 
disappears, and a new cloud is started at the point at which we have 
observed the soldier. 
This is precisely the same thing as the 'reduction of the wave 
packet,' ...... .It even occurs, though in a slightly more trivial way, in any 
such game as tossing pennies: relative to the information that we have 
tossed heads, the (relative) probability that we have tossed heads from lh 
to 1. That this is fundamentally the same problem as that which has 
disturbed the quantum theorists27. 
In short, Popper points out that the sudden change of probability occurs 
even in the case of throwing a coin, and that those trivial phenomena are 
precisely what the reduction of wave packet means. Obviously this claim 
has the same way with my argument of suggesting that the problem of 
collapse of wave packet in quantum mechanics is just one sign of 
characteristics of probability concept in general. However, Popper 
extends his claim to even say that there is nothing problematic in that 
sudden change. He develops the same point as this and makes a stronger 
claim in other parts of the same book or his The Logic of Scien tine 
Discovery in terms of this next thought-experiment that comes from 
Einstein and that Heisenberg also mentions28• 
Take a semi-transparent mirror, and assume that the probability that 
light will be reflected by it is lh. Thus the probability that light pass 
through will also be lh, and we have the next equation (a), if the event 
'passing through' or 'transmitted' is a, and the experimental arrangement 
b, 
(a) P(a,b) = lh = P(-a, b), 
where '-a' (that is, 'non-a' ) stands for the event 'reflection.' Provided 
that the experiment be carried out with one single photon, the probability 
wave packet associated with this photon will spirit, and we shall have the 
two wave packets corresponding to P(a, b) and p( - a, b) in the above 
equation. Now let us assume that we find, with the help of photographic 
plate, that the photon was reflected, i.e. - a. Then, according to 
Heisenberg, the probability of finding the photon in the other part of the 
packet immediately becomes zercf.9 . What has happened? We had, and 
27 Popper (1982), pp.123-124. 
28 Popper (1982), pp.76-78 and Popper (1959), pp.235-236. 
29 Heisenberg (1930), p.39. 
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still have, the relative probabilities expressed by (a). If we take the 
information - a, then relative to this information we get this (/3), 
(/3) Pea, -a) = 0, PC-a, -a) = 1. 
Certainly it is true that pea, - a) = 0, but it is quite wrong to suggest that 
it is a kind of changed form of the original packet Pea, b) which 
'immediately becomes zero.' The original packet pea, b) remains equal to 
'l2, which is to be interpreted as meaning that if we repeat our original 
experiment, the virtual frequency of photons being transmitted will equal 
to'l2. And Pea, -a), which is zero, is quite another relative probability. It 
refers to an entirely different experiment which, although it begins like the 
first, ends according to its specification only when we find that the photon 
has been reflected. No action is exerted upon the wave packet Pea, b), 
because pea, b) is the propensity of the state of the photon relative to the 
original experimental conditions. This has not changed. Thus, the 
reduction of wave packet clearly has nothing to do with quantum theory: it 
is a trivial feature of probability theory that, whatever a may be, pea, a) = 1 
and pea, - a) = 0. When we toss a coin, the probability of each of its 
possible states (i.e. head or tail) equals 'l2. As long as we do not look at the 
result of our toss, we can still say that the probability will be 'l2. If we bend 
down and look, it suddenly 'changes.' Was there a quantum jump, owing 
to our looking? Was the coin influenced by our observation? Obviously 
not. That's Popper's argument, which rather seems to be so strong as to 
trivialize CPR. 
I will raise three points towards the Popper's argument. First, it must 
be extremely counterintuitive to accept Popper's argument altogether, 
because his point would make probability kinematics impossible in 
principle although that is usually recognized as one field of the philosophy 
of probability. Actually we don't think at all there is something 
problematic about saying that probability changes, but, Popper's argument 
seems to forbid us from saying so, which sounds ridiculous. Additionally 
if we follow his argument, we might lead to such an idea that the world is 
re-born every moment into a new different one without any continuation. 
This idea sounds to be utterly unacceptable. It is true that it's possible to 
accept the idea, but doing so makes a lot of sacrifices. In fact, Popper 
himself virtually mentions the notion of probability-change when saying; 
'it is the objective propensity of a which may become zero.30' This seems 
to contradict his criticism against Reisenberg. Second, Popper asserts 
that p( - a, - a) = 1 has no problem at all since this is just a trivial 
tautology, but it seems to me that he passes thorough a philosophical 
question without stopping to consider. If we follow his idea and formulate 
exactly, what matters here is how P('the photon is reflected', 'the photon 
was reflected') should be dealt with, which isn't necessarily treated as a 
30 Popper (1982), p.88. 
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self-evident tautology. The second term is the sentence in the past tense, 
while the first one is tenseless or in the future tense, and perhaps based on 
a counterfactual supposition. Undoubtedly here is a delicate 
philosophical problem hidden like temporal difficulty I mentioned. In any 
case, all that Popper can claim is that P('the photon was reflected', 'the 
photon was reflected') = 1, which is absolutely trivial, making no sense and 
useless here. 
Third, as is shown by Popper's declaration that observation has no 
influence on the coin at all, he tacitly makes a presupposition that only 
physical phenomena could be accepted as causal influence, upon which he 
concludes that observation, knowledge or ignorance has nothing to do with 
causal process. The same argument can be found in the part in which he 
makes fun of Pauli by saying that Pauli takes our ignorance to increase 
entropy31 . However, such argument isn't fair at all. Obviously, it is 
merely a dogma that causal influence takes place only about physical 
phenomena, as we can draw as many examples as we like concerning 
causal influence in a psychological or epistemic phase. For instance, it 
would be inevitable that, if I suddenly recognized the person in front of me 
to be my boss that I haven't met yet, the recognition will causally influence 
my psychological state. Considering this, Popper's argument will not 
necessarily work, if the observer in the collapse of wave packet or 
probability could be supposed to be something giving causal influence in 
such a non-physical level. Actually, as a matter of fact, the causal 
understanding of physical phenomena depends upon our network of 
knowledge, which would make it not so unreasonable to think that an 
observer's action of applying the network to the phaeneomana is the cause 
to trigger the whole process. In fact, even Popper himself declares that; 
'even the 'observation' of a part of the track of the particle in position space 
is ...... actually an interpretation in the light of theories, in spite of its 
apparent intuitive obviousness.32' This line of thought would affect the 
objective status of Popper's 'propensity,' which can be actually confirmed 
by this Popper's definition of the notion of propensity; 
This application of probability theory to single cases is precisely what 
the propensity interpretation achieves. But it does not achieve it by 
speakinfg about particles or photons. Propensities are properties of 
neither particles nor photons nor electrons nor pennies. Propensity 
statements in physics describe properties of the situation, and are 
testable if this situation is typical, that is, if it repeats itself (such as in 
the case of the emission of light). They are, therefore, also properties of 
repeatable experimental arrangements: physical and concrete33. 
If so, we can ask; who sets up the repeatable experimental arrangement? 
31 Popper (1982), pp.109-ll0. 
32 Popper (1982), p.143. 
33 Popper (1982), p.79-80. 
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Who arranges it? Obviously someone must artificially arranges it with 
the background of some scientific knowledge. Accordingly, here is 
definitely some person who has a particular knowledge of science and gives 
a particular idea, contrary to Popper's official treatment of 'propensity' as 
objective. If we mean an independence of observer's knowledge by 
'objective,' Popper's 'propensity' could not be objective by definition. 
Rather it seems that we could say it's epistemic. Anyway, however, it is 
also certain there was room in the side of quantum mechanics that 
incurred Popper's criticism, since they seemed to describe causal influence 
of observation in the collapse of wave packet as if in the same level with 
physical phenomena (as if it is light emitted from our eyes). Thus, in any 
case we can say that it's possible for our observation to cause the collapse 
of probability, as CPH claims. At least my argument so far confirms 
that PPE and CPH is concerned with epistemic interpretation of 
probability as well as objective one, because Popper's theory of propensity, 
which gives my argument main materials, seems to commit itself to an 
epistemic interpretation with professing itself to be an objective theory. 
To sum up, Popper's theory supports my argument in that he also 
takes what is called the collapse of wave packet to be not restricted to 
microcosmic quantum movements but ordinarily recognized anywhere in 
our daily life concerning the concept of probability. However, at the same 
time, I could show that my argument is applicable to any interpretation of 
probability concept by pointing out that Popper's theory, which gives my 
main materials as a representative view of objective interpretations, 
substantially commits itself to an epistemic interpretation. 
5, Argument from Humphreys' Paradox 
In the following, I'm going to verify whether CPH is capable of 
explaining anything probabilistic or not, and clarify what kind of 
implication CPH eventually brings. In order to do that, I take up the 
problem called 'Humphreys' Paradox'. The paradox is not only thought to 
raise a fundamental difficulty about the concept of probability, but also 
seems to be a typical example of puzzles that could be solved by applying 
CPH. That is a process of verifying CPH. Mter that, I want to consider 
what results CPH produces by scrutinizing why 'Humphreys' Paradox' is 
thought to be a problem. This is the next step of clarification of CPH's 
implication, which will lead to a deeper difficulty. 
Now, what is Humphreys' Paradox? This paradox was first proposed 
by Paul Humphreys, and then published by Salmon34 , after which it was 
named 'Humphreys' Paradox' by Fetzer35 . The paradox originally casts 
doubt on the propensity interpretation through making inverse conditional 
probability in terms of Bayes's theorem. There are some versions of this 
paradox, of which I quote the next clearest one that Salmon re-mentioned 
in a later year; 
34 Salmon (1979), pp.183-216. 
35 Fetzer (1981), p.283. 
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\" . 
(Can Opener Case) 
Consider, for example, a factory that produces can opener. There are 
only two machines, which we may designate A and B, in the factory. 
Machine A is ancient; it produces one thousand can openers per day, and 
2.5% of these are defective. Machine B is more modern; it produces ten 
thousand can openers per day, and only 1% of its products are defective . 
Suppose, at the end of the day, that all of the defective can openers 
(which have been stored by the inspectors) are placed in a box. 
Someone randomly picks a can opener out of the box, and ask for the 
probability that it was produced by the modern machine B. We can 
easily calculate the answer; it is 4/5. Nevertheless, I find it quite 
unacceptable to say that this defective can opener has a propensity of 0.8 
to have been produced by machine B. It makes good sense to say that 
machine B has a propensity of 0.01 to produce defective can openers, but 
not to say of the can opener that it has a certain propensity to have been 
produced by that machine36 . 
Let D = that the picked can opener is defective. Let A = that it was 
produced by machine A. Let B = that it was produced by machine B. 
Then, by definition, P(D I A) = 2511000, P(D I B) = 11100, P(A) = 1/11, P(B) = 
10/11 . The probability questioned here is P(B I D). We can calculate this 
by using Bayes' theorem as follows; 
P(B I D) = P(D I B)P(B) / P(D) 
= P(D I B)P(B) / P(D I A)P(A) + P(D I B)P(B) 
= 11100 X 10/11 / 25/1000 X 1111 + 11100 X 10/11 
= 100/11000/ 125/11000 
= 4/5 
That is perfectly clear, as far as Bayes' theorem is accepted. And I have 
no reason to refuse Bayes' theorem at all. Then, what is the problem? 
Gillies lucidly describes how this is paradoxical by using the frisbee 
example, so I paraphrase his expression using can openers instead of 
frisbees. That is to say, 'the picking of a defective can opener from the box 
in the evening is a partial cause of weight 4/5 of its having been produced 
by machine B earlier in the day. Such a concept seems to be nonsense, 
because by the time the can opener was selected, it would either definitely 
have been produced by machine B or definitely not have been produced by 
36 Salmon (1984) , p.205. 
36 
machine B. We can make the point more vivid by supposing that machine 
A produces white can openers and machine B orange can openers. If the 
defective can opener picked at the end of the day was orange, it would 
definitely have been produced by machine B, and it is not clear what would 
be the sense of saying that it had a propensity 4/5 to have been produced by 
machine B'37. In short, if we understand the can opener example in terms 
of the propensity theory, we have to adopt the notion of PARTIAL 
BACKWARD CAUSATION, which seems to be too absurd to be accepted. 
Roughly speaking, three types of reaction to Humphreys' Paradox 
have been presented. First, it is claimed that this paradox shows the 
inappropriateness of the propensity interpretation of probability, therefore 
we simply have to give up the propensity theory. This is advocated by 
Humphreys himself and Milne. Humphreys is fully aware of the causal 
difficulty appearing here, and initially declares; 'the causal nature of 
propensities cannot be adequately represented by standard probability 
theory.3s' Milen similarly emphasizes the strangeness of applying Bayes' 
theorem of conditional probability to propensity of events, and concludes 
that 'conditional probabilities cannot adequately be treated in realist 
single-case interpretation of probability,' then suggesting the shift to an 
interpretation based upon the long run frequencies39. Milen points out 
that this paradox consists of three premises, namely, conditional 
probability, the link between realist single-case interpretations and the 
indeterminate, and the claim that the past and the present are 
determinate unlike the future. Then he said that anyone rejection of 
these premises is an unhappy choice40. The second reaction is that we 
should clarify which case is and which case is not suitable for us to apply 
Bayes' theorem to the propensity of events. This is developed by McCurdy. 
He tries to secure the situation in which inverse conditional probabilities 
about propensity is perfectly meaningful by taking into account the time 
when we calculate the conditional probability. For instance, take up 
again the can opener example and let t1 indicate the morning before 
machines move, t2 any arbitrary daytime when machines are working, ts 
the end of the day when someone picks a can opener from the box, and 
suppose that Pti(Dtj ! Btk) is interpreted as "the probability at 1;; for D at tj, 
conditional upon B occurring at tk. Let's compare those two probabilities 
(ignoring the background information now for brevity), 
(1) Pt1(Bt2! Dts) 
(2) Pts(Bt2! Dts) 
McCurdy's claim is to the effect that (1) perfectly makes sense and is given 
37 Cf. Gillies (2000), p.131. 
38 Humphreys (1985), p.557. 
39 Milne (1986), p.131. 
40 Milne (1986), p.132. 
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the value 4/5, while (2) is an absolute nonsense, because once the event Dt3 
or "" Dt3 has been realized, there is no indeterminacy about the 
occurrence of the event Bt2 - it has either occurred or not41 . In other 
words, on the one hand, he entirely agree that Humphreys' case is involved 
in a paradoxical difficulty when we understand it in the sense of (2), but on 
the other hand, he maintains that inverse conditional probability through 
Bayes' theorem is unproblematically applicable to the propensity 
interpretation when we consider Humphreys' case before events concerned 
occur, as (1). This is an attempt of defending the propensity theory even if 
partially. Then, McCurdy, appealing to Niiniluoto's suggestion42, also 
adds the point that (1) is a physical probability, whereas (2) is an epistemic 
probability 43 . Now, the third reaction is simple. Namely, since 
Humphreys' paradox only proves that the propensity theory as realist 
single-case interpretation of probability is insupportable, we can still 
support and refine the long-run propensity theory, which is immune from 
the paradox. That is alluded by Milne as above, and deliberately 
proposed by Gillies44. But, this third reaction is outside the scope of my 
interest, because I provisionally want to discuss only the probability of 
single event as PPE shows. 
Certainly, here is a truly serious difficulty about probability. Then, 
what reaction should I offer by applying CPH? There are several things 
to say, but first of all, I want to make sure this point; as soon as I pick a 
(either white or orange) can opener from the box and see it, the probability 
of the can opener's being orange collapses into 0 or 1 according to CPH, 
therefore there is no room to ask the probability, at least soon after the 
collapse. So, if Humphreys' case takes the issue of probability after the 
collapse, it is very natural for the case to fall into a paradoxical un solvable 
situation because no substantial question exists. It's like the case of 
questioning what the probability of probability 1 is. In this sense, I think 
that Humphreys' paradox is nonsense from the outset, so it's not 
persuasive to conclude the inappropriateness of the propensity theory from 
this paradox. However, I don't intend to say that Humphreys' paradox 
doesn't touch any crucial point at all about probability. It seems that 
some hidden significant implication about probability will come into view 
by modifying and remaking the paradox and then applying CPH to it. 
How do we modify it? Well, suppose the next condition in the can opener 
case. 
(Modified Version) 
The box in which all defective can openers are placed at the end of the 
day is made of wood, so its content isn't seen from the outside. Then, I 
am told to pick one can opener from the box. I put my hand into the box 
41 McCurdy (1996), p.107 ff. 
42 Niiniluoto (1998), pp.l03-04 note 16. 
43 McCurdy (1996) , p .121. 
44 Gillies (2000), p .131-136. 
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and grasp a particular single can opener. At that moment I am asked 
what is the probability that it was produced by the modern machine B. 
Namely, I am asked before I take it out and see it. 
This situation is just arranged in a more detailed way than the original, so 
nothing is changed with regard to the calculation of probability. 
Therefore, it still come to that P(B I D) = 4/5 in terms of Bayes' theorem. 
Now, how do we understand the result, p(B I D) = 4/5, in this situation? 
Is it paradoxical? According to CPH, the probability hasn't collapsed yet, 
since we haven't observed it, or in other words along the terminology of 
PPE, we haven't recognized whether it's white or orange45. Thus, the case 
must be that P(B I D) < 1 as far as we accept CPH. We have strong reason 
to follow Bayes' theorem to assign 4/5 to P(B I D). Let 13 indicate the time 
when I grasp a particular can opener, and I think that even the calculation, 
P13(Bt21 D13) = 4/5, which was presented along McCurdy's argument above, 
is likewise accepted. Is there something wrong? The problem is 
undoubtedly our intuitive idea that the can opener grasped by me was 
already actually fixed either white or orange, irrespective of being seen or 
not. This idea urges us to refuse to simply apply Bayes' theorem even to 
the modified version of Humphreys' paradox as well. Yes, I agree with the 
idea. I usually live with having such an idea as this, of course. But, I'm 
now considering a philosophical problem through a kind of 
thought-experiment. From such theoretical point of view, what must be 
noticed first is that this idea is supported by determinism about the past, 
which insists that the past event either happened or not, wherefore the 
probability of its occurrence must be either 1 or O. To put it differently 
with Dummett's taste, that idea takes it for granted that the law of 
excluded middle is applied to the past. That is presumed. Well, how can 
it be presumed? By what ground? Honestly speaking, I think there is no 
decisive ground on which we have to presume it. We are usually living 
having that presumption, and maybe the presumption could be inferred 
with A CERTAIN DEGREE OF conviction. But, still there is nothing to 
completely block other possibilities, which means that the conviction is not 
perfect, not reaching probability 1. A.J. Ayer once correctly pointed out 
about the notion of sense-data that sense-data language is just chosen by 
our resolution and nothing more than that46 . I want to say the same thing 
here. Our intuitive idea of determinism about the past is always only 
45 Someone suspects that the concept of observation or recognition is quite vague here, 
for grasping something can be a sort of recognition in a tangible sense, although I'm not 
sure it can be also called a tangible observation (?). But, this doubt can be easily 
dispelled by modifying further, if necessary, the condition into that; each defective can 
opener placed in the wooden box is randomly numbered by the inspector from 1 to 125, 
and then I am told to choose a particular number within those and asked what is the 
probability that the particular can opener with the number was produced by the 
modern machine B. Modifying in this way, we avoid being involved in the problem of 
vagueness about the concept of recognition. 
46 Ayer (1940), p.28. 
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chosen by our (perhaps instinctive?) resolution. The past event that isn't 
recognized yet, although vividly represented in a specified way (e.g. in this 
particular box right now), must be assigned smaller than probability 1, as I 
said earlier. As I mentioned before, Milen regarded the determinacy of 
the past as a basic premise incapable ofrejection. But, it's not necessarily 
true. This is an implication of CPH. In other words, the difficulty of 
Humphreys' paradox directly arises from determinism about the past 
rather than from partial backward causation. So, since determinism can 
be rejected, Humphreys' paradox can be solved. 
Certainly, this argument might sound strange first, but it's always 
neither absurd nor inconsistent with our common sense. In reality, what 
can you say about the content of the wooden box? We may suppose that 
we surely had seen white and orange can openers placed in the box. Even 
if so, can we be truly sure that those can openers remains to be with the 
same fixed colours in an absolutely perfect sense? You may say, it is 
certainly confirmed if we actually check the content. But, I'm asking 
about the case before being checked as in the modified version. 
Determinism, which is just a result of our resolution, isn't completely 
grounded, either. Thus, theoretically speaking, the probability of can 
openers' keeping the same situation in the box must be smaller than 1. In 
fact, we are ordinarily thinking in this way with regard to historical events. 
I t is not strange at all to use the concept of probability in describing history, 
even though it was clearly in the past. Suppose the case that a certain 
historical figure was confirmed to be in a particular place at a particular 
time, but the person was missing for two years after that, then some plural 
stories had been told about her behaviours for that missing period. In 
that case, we usually apply probability to each story in such an 
unrecognized case, and then assign probability smaller than 1. Actually it 
is not rare that Bayesian theory is applied to confirm a hypothesis about 
historical events, as McCullagh investigates47. This kind of argument 
might also remind someone of a famous discussion concerning the reality of 
miracle that Hume once presented by appealing to the concept of 
probability48. In any case, those arguments regarding history is quite 
normal, and is entirely consistent with PPE and CPH. Thus, even 
ordinarily speaking, we may say that the probability of the can openers' 
keeping the same situation in the box is smaller than 1. If so, there is 
nothing wrong in applying B aye s' theorem to the modified version of 
Humphreys' paradox and drawing the result, P(B I D) = 4/5. 
Now, someone has already found that what I argued so far is 
remarkably similar to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, 
at least as regards their structure of argument. Yes, I think so, too. 
Actually, there are three reasons for that. First, since even macrocosmic 
phenomena are composed of microcosmic quantum phenomena, the 
problem deriving from quantum phenomena is theoretically applicable to 
47 McCullagh (1984), pp.57-64 . 
48 Hume (1975), Section X. 
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macrocosmic phenomena, even though by an infinitely subtle amount. 
Second, Humphreys' paradox was originally presented in relation to the 
propensity theory which had been initially motivated by quantum 
mechanics, so it may be natural for the analysis of the paradox to result in 
the situation similar to the measurement problem. Third, the collapse of 
probability that arises out of the measurement problem in quantum 
mechanics can be rather thought to be one of natural implication of 
probability concept in general, as I said earlier, so the case is inverse, i.e. 
the collapse of probability expressed in CPH finally leads to the 
measurement problem in quantum mechanics as one result. 
However, we mustn't stop here, because the measurement problem is 
the very problem which is still controversial. I have said earlier that 
determinism isn't completely grounded, but it's just a theoretical remark. 
As a matter of fact, we always choose determinism about the past, even if 
it's not an only possible option. Therefore, the measurement problem 
sounds truly problematic, which was shed light on in an enormously 
impressive way by well known Schrodinger's cat. I think that the same 
thing is true of Humphreys' paradox concerning the structure of argument, 
although, of course, we mustn't overlook the fact that there is a big 
difference between Schrodinger's cat and Humphreys' paradox from the 
viewpoint of physics. At all events, anyway, we should say that 
Humphreys' paradox is theoretically not paradoxical, but practically still 
paradoxical. If so, we have to examine further how such a paradox 
practically arises and what consequence the paradox brings about. 
Before moving to the next stage, I want to notice one basic point. 
What I discussed so far concerns mainly the propensity interpretation of 
probability, as is clear from remembering how Humphreys' paradox was 
initially presented. However, I want to emphasize that this paradox is 
applied to the epistemic interpretation as well. Look at the modified 
version of the paradox. In this case, an application of Bayes' theorem 
perfectly makes sense, because we are subjectively uncertain of whether 
the grasped can opener is white or orange. But, at the same time, we also 
accept determinism about the past even from the subjective point of view. 
We don't believe that the situation of can openers is changed or unstable 
after they are placed in the wooden box, unless something special happens. 
Therefore, we subjectively believe that the colour of grasped can opener is 
already fixed the moment I grasp. Namely, it is probabilistic in a 
subjective or epistemic sense whether I grasp a white can opener or an 
orange one, but it is certain even in a subjective sense that the grasped can 
opener was already made by either machine A or B independently of my 
grasping. The distinction between the physical probability and the 
epistemic probability as Niiniluoto and McCurdy suggested seems to miss 
the mode of our subjective belief in determinism about the past. 
Humphreys' paradox is the paradox to the epistemic interpretation of 
probability, too. Accordingly, my argument so far is concerned with not 
only the propensity interpretation but also the subjective one. Actually 
this point was already confirmed by examining Popper's propensity theory 
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in the previous section. 
6, Retroactive Assignment of Probability 1 
Now, let's face the question, why do we accept the determinism about 
the past in an objective sense? Why do we believe in the determinism 
about the past subjectively as well? Clearly, this question is deeply 
conjoined with a question about how to understand the past. This is so 
grand a question that I can't deal with it thoroughly here, of course, but 
perhaps, presenting my basic intuition about the past might be forgiven. 
It seems to me that the past registers in our minds most realistically when 
we regret something we did or feel nostalgic for what we were. Can we 
think that such case is an original occasion for us to learn the meaning of 
the past, and then we extend the meaning to other cases by generalizing it? 
It might be. So, I suppose hypothetically that it is the case. Thus, these 
two points should be noticed. 
(a) When we regret something or feel nostalgic for something, the past 
scene in the memory is vividly represented in a specified way, 
although the memory might be wrong. 
(b) The past scene is thought to be inalterable, which characterizes 
regret or nostalgia differently from out attitude towards the future, 
i.e. such an attitude that we can somehow alter or control the future. 
According to PPE and CPH, (a) seems to simply imply that the probability 
of the event concerned must be 1, and that our representation causes the 
probability 1. However, we must note that PPE and CPH stipulate only 
the case of the moment the event has happened (thus I inserted, 'as soon 
as', 'just now'), whereas (a) covers the case long after the event happened 
as well as the case of the moment it has happened. Therefore, to be exact, 
it's not appropriate to apply PPE and CHP to the case of regret or nostalgia. 
As a matter of fact, past events regretted or felt nostalgic can be mistaken, 
hence I added, 'the memory might be wrong'. In addition, such case might 
also be involved in the temporal difficulty of probability 1 that I mentioned 
earlier by appealing to the factor of forgetting. Thus, it's utterly 
reasonable to assign probability smaller than 1 to the events regretted or 
felt nostalgic, except for the case that we regret or feel nostalgic for 
something which has just now happened. But, nevertheless, the notion of 
regret or nostalgia, perhaps grammatically, requires that all past events 
regretted and felt nostalgic actually happened and were already fixed in 
terms of (a) and (b). Otherwise, those notions will lose their intrinsic 
meanings. If the event concerned could be non-existent or altered, neither 
regret nor nostalgia would arise. But, thus, how could we understand this 
situation? My understanding might sound Humean; some FICTION as if 
we are observing it now is introduced here. We regret or feel nostalgic for 
something past by fictitiously representing those past events as actually 
just now happened, so as having probability 1. In this case, the 
probability of those events is supposed to have probability smaller than 1 
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before our representation. At least they can't have probability 1 at all 
before representation in the sense of PPE and CPR. Therefore, the 
sudden change of probability appears to occur here. If we think 
analogously to CPH, we could say that our representing when regretting or 
feeling nostalgic, as it were, CAUSES the sudden change of probability 
from smaller than 1 to 1. In other words, probability of those past events 
collapses in a RETROACTIVE way by our fictitious representation. 
The argument thus far is concerned only with such special cases as 
regret and nostalgia. But, can there be other cases of representing the past 
that are structurally similar to regret and nostalgia? I think there is. 
That is the case that we recognize something static as the same as it was 
some while before. In this case, we represent the shape of it in the past 
and recognize the present one as the same. Rather, we overlap two 
shapes. As a result, we represent the past event very vividly. Does this 
resemble the case of regret or nostalgia with regard to the way of 
representation? Yes, definitely. Thus, the retroactive collapse of 
probability by fictitious representation seems to appear, too. The 
probability of the existence of the static thing in the past is estimated as 1 
although this case doesn't exactly meet PPE and CPH. This process, if 
any, seems to be immensely influential in our conception of the past, since 
static things, the most fundamental of which is the earth, forms the most 
basic background of our epistemic activities. Therefore, this process of 
retrospectively assigning probability 1 to the past event is naturally 
extended to the whole understanding of the past in general, however 
fictitious it is. Thus, determinism is born here. We become inclined to 
think that past events are already determined and fixed irrespective of our 
recognition, wherefore the probability of the occurrence of those events 
must be 1. Perhaps, this way of thinking suits very well our ordinary 
language in a practical sense, because the concept of responsibility or 
ascription forms a very important part of our practical talk, and such 
concept obviously requires the fixed and determined status of the past, 
hence I call this context practical rather than theoretical. Anyway, I 
propose what I argued thus far as the Retroactive Probability Hypothesis 
(RPH) in the following; 
(RPH) Our fictitious representation of past events CAUSES probability 
to RETROACT to the past and collapse into value 1, from which 
DETERMINISM about the past appears. 
RPH might seem to be odd at first sight, but such first impression could be 
eliminated by a bit of reflection about our actual notion of the past. I 
mean the condition that the past is nowhere by definition of the notion, so 
its verification is impossible in nature therefore the past is spoken 
necessarily through some fictitious taste. To be fictitious is the intrinsic 
character of the past. In this respect, it is quite natural that the narrative 
theory of history is often claimed. At least, regarding the past as real in 
the literal sense is either a philosophical deception or an intellectual 
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negligence. 
Two points should be confirmed. First, we could explain why 
Humphreys' paradox sounds paradoxical by applying RPH to it. As a 
matter of fact, we tend to think that can openers in the wooden box has 
been already fixed with regard to their colours, i.e. their probabilities of 
being made by machine B must be either 1 or 0, before we see them, hence 
it sounds absurd to apply Bayes's theorem to a particular can opener 
grasped by me in the box in order to calculate the probability of having 
already been made by machine B. All of this arises only from our 
fictitious representation at the time of grasping the particular can opener, 
namely, the representation as if we had been observing the can opener in 
the box in spite of the fact that it wasn't actually observed. Thus, RPH 
elucidates this quite perplexed situation. In this respect, Timothy 
Williamson's objection to my modified version of Humphreys' paradox is 
worth mentioning. He objected that my modified version will not make 
sense if some videos machine would be set in the box, since in that case the 
colour of a particular can opener is known to have been fixed before we see 
it49• To this, first of all, I would like to answer that probability about the 
information recorded in video machine would also collapse the moment we 
see it, so this case couldn't be an objection to my argument. But, his video 
example is very suggestive, because this example will illustrate well the 
situation expressed by RPH. Namely, as his example impressively 
alludes, we are strongly inclined to make a fictitious representation as if 
we were observing the past, thereby virtually causing the retroactive 
collapse of probability into 1 through the representation. Thus, RPH might 
be strengthened by his video example. Well, incidentally, it seems to me 
that the paradoxical impression given by Schrodinger's cat might be partly 
derived from our similar fictitious representation as if we were seeing the 
inside of the box in which a cat is placed. Anyway, determinism about the 
past necessarily appears in those situations, where paradoxes stand up. 
Second, RPH clearly implies some form of BACKWARD CAUSATION 
in the sense that our present representation is the cause of the collapse of 
probability in the past, even though in a fictitious way. As I mentioned, 
Milne and Gillies diagnosed Humphreys' paradox as coming from a 
ridiculous notion of (partiaD backward causation. They are right in a 
certain sense. Some backward causation really matters in Humphreys' 
paradox. However, what backward causation is concerned is not in the 
partial contribution (by 4/5) to produce the past result, but in the overall 
formation of determinism about the past which provides us with the 
background to make the partial backward contribution paradoxical. Then, 
how should we treat this backward causation? Should we abandon it 
instantly as complete nonsense? Certainly, my argument is consistent 
with this strategy of abandoning backward causation, since I take the idea 
expressed by RPH to be a fiction. But, what we should notice is that, if we 
49 Williamson raised this objection on 29th May 2003 when I visited his office at New 
College of Oxford. 
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abandon the notion of backward causation altogether, we simultaneously 
have to abolish the conception of determinism about the past, according to 
RPH. All are dependent upon how we should estimate the concept of 
fiction. If we must reject everything fictitious, we have to give up the 
determinism about the past. Yet, on the contrary, if we accept that our 
epistemic activities are intrinsically involved in something fictitious, as it 
were, in the form of metaphysical commitments concerning reality, time 
and causation, we should face the fact that we are living with having the 
determinism about the past in a fictitious sense. I think that the latter 
route is more natural and reasonable. Perhaps, what we should do after 
accepting the latter route is to be very careful to distinguish those fictitious 
factors as fictitious when understanding our epistemic activities. In truth, 
we can regard the fictitious representation in RPH as a sort of 
counterfactual conditionals such as, 'if we had seen the inside of the box, 
we would have found an orange can opener.' And, such sort of 
counterfactual conditionals is quite common for us to use in order to 
understand a dispositional character of usual physical things like, 'fragile', 
'flammable', and so on. Additionally, as is often discussed in the 
philosophy of free will, we ordinarily appeal to the conception, 'could have 
done otherwise', to judge whether a certain person are responsible or not50. 
Obviously, this ordinary conception is also made through a form of 
counterfactual conditionals51 . If so, the fictitious representation in RPH 
shouldn't be instantly refused by reason of being fictitious. 
Furthermore, a bit more careful deliberation enables us to notice that 
even backward causation is actually supposed in some cases. For 
instance, as Suppes points out, 'it is widely known, and often commented 
upon, that the basic equation of classical physics remain valid under a 
transformation from time t to -t.52' But, of course, this reversibility, or 
'this invariance under a change of direction of time ...... creates a natural 
philosophical tension about the nature of causal processes, 53' for our 
ordinary causal concepts work only forwards. In any case, we shouldn't 
ignore that the possibility of backward causation is taken seriously at least 
in physics. In fact, tachyons or anti-particles are supposed to operate 
backwards 54 • Presumably, philosophical discussion about backward 
causation that has become one of indispensable topics in the philosophy of 
50 I discussed this problem in Ichinose (2003), pp .I-18. 
51 As to the character of 'could have done otherwise' condition as counterfactual 
conditionals, it was when I joined the lectures of Martha Klein at Oxford in the Trinity 
Term of 2003 that I came to realize the necessity to examine it. Her lectures entitled 
'Free Will, Moral Responsibility and Punishment' was definitely stimulating and full of 
insights. I am thankful to her. Also cf. Klein (1990). 
52 Suppes (2001), p .203. Suppes himself firmly believes that causal relation works 
forwards , and emphasizes that not strongly reversible systems prevail in nature, which 
reinforces our personal experience to support the commonsense view of forward 
causation. See Suppes (2001), p.212. 
53 Suppes (2001), p.203. 
54 Cf., Horwich (1987), pp.lOl-102. 
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causation since Dummett might be encouraged by the current stream of 
physics. Moreover, it's even possible to find some examples of backward 
causation in our ordinary experience rather than theoretical physics. I 
want to mention an example of apparent motion which Nelson Goodman 
once discussed in an impressive way. This is a phenomenon in which we 
fictitiously perceive the motion of flashed spot if two spots short distant 
from each other are flashed in a certain interval. This phenomenon is 
actually common in the case of neon signs or pictures of TV. Then, 
Goodman asks, 'how are we able in the apparent motion to fill in the spot 
at the intervening place-time along a path running from the first to the 
second flash before the second flash occurs?55' Goodman answers that the 
apparent motion is constructed only after the second flash occurs although 
seen as running from the first to the second flash. He calls it the 
retrospective construction theory56. Obviously, this could be interpreted 
as an example of backward causation in the sense that our seeing the 
second flash causes the past motion of spot from the first flash to the 
second one. If that is the case, it's reasonable to think that we might be 
ordinarily involved in a certain form of backward causation, even if it's 
described as fictitious. Thus, the situation expressed by RPH must be 
taken to be more than simply fictitious. 
7, Newcomb's Problem and Determinism 
Now, how should we estimate the status of determinism that appears 
in RPH? I'm closing my argument by briefly verifying this. I want to 
mention here another paradox that is as perplexed as Humphreys' paradox, 
in order only to illustrate my points or make my points stand out. That is, 
Newcomb's Problem, which is well known since Nozick published it57. 
Here I quote the simplest description that Nozick gave in a later year. 
(Newcomb's Problem) 
A being in whose power to predict your choices correctly you have great 
confidence is going to predict your choice in the following situation. 
There are two boxes, Bl and B2. Box Bl contains $1,000; box B2 
contains either $1,000,000 ($M) or nothing. You have a choice between 
two actions: (1) taking what is in both boxes; (2) taking only what is in 
the second box. Furthermore, you know, and the being knows you know, 
and so on, that if the being predicts you will take what is in both boxes, 
he does not put the $M in the second box; if the being predicts you will 
take only what is in the second box he does put the $M in the second box. 
First the being makes his prediction; then he puts the $M in the second 
box or not, according to his prediction; then you make your choice58. 
55 Goodman (1978), p.73. 
56 Goodman (1978),p.8l. 
51 Cf. Nozick (1985), pp.107-133. 
58 Nozick (1993), p.4l. 
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It is also well known that a lot of literature on this problem has been piled 
up, and many views have been proposed. To examine those views is not 
my aim here. I make only summarized comments for the sake of 
concluding my argument. Those views about Newcomb's problem include 
so-called one-boxer (people claiming that we should choose the option (2) as 
far as we seek as much money as possible), two boxer (people claiming that 
we should choose the option (1)59, and other views like no-boxer (people 
claiming that this problem is incoherent and underdetermined) 60 or 
Nozick's one (introducing another notion, symbolic utility, to clarify the 
complicatedness of the problem). Roughly speaking, I think that the 
viewpoint of no-boxer is a bit too honest to be interesting, since it's quite 
easy to argue that this problem is incoherent because of including the 
supernatural being that can predict correctly with an extremely high 
probability (but probability smaller than 1, otherwise the problem doesn't 
make sense). The attitude of no-boxer seems to be obstinately refusing 
any fictitious, or metaphysical, factors. But, such attitude doesn't 
harmonize with RPH. In fact, as Mackie describes, this problem might 
include a sort of backward causation in the sense that your choice causes 
the correct prediction if one-boxer's argument is somehow reasonable. 
Mackie himself seems to develop a no-boxer argument by mentioning 
various absurdities drawn from Newcomb's problem, one of which comes 
from backward causation 61. However, as I have discussed, it's not 
necessarily an acceptable attitude to reject backward causation from the 
outset. Also two-boxer arguments seem to share such attitude with 
no-boxer in this respect. Those arguments appeal to our intuitive idea 
that, once the being makes a prediction and determines what is in the 
second box, the content of the second box is already fixed irrespective of 
your later choice. The reason why two-boxers think so is simply that the 
notion of backward causation is absurd, although they accept the setting of 
Newcomb's problem as possible unlike no-boxers, then offer the choice of 
two boxes as rational. 
I want to emphasize, I don't intend at all to claim that the setting of 
Newcomb's problem is perfectly reasonable and realistic. There is no 
doubt at all that this is just a story. But, what I want to pay my attention 
to here is the fact that this story is possible to understand. We could 
imagine its situation as if it were actually happening. I wish to bring this 
understandability into focus . From this point of view, it's not appropriate 
to estimate Newcomb's problem by presupposing beforehand that notions 
of the being with supernatural power of prediction and backward causation 
are ridiculous. Evidently, Newcomb's problem is a kind of 
thought-experiment to verify our way of making decision, so it's not 
strange for it to include somehow unrealistic factors. Furthermore, as I 
said, our ordinary understanding of things is tinged with something 
59 Cf. Sainsbury (1995) , p .60. 
60 Cf. Camp bell (1985) , pp.24-27. 





fictitious through dispositional words. In any case, we must say that 
particularly two-boxer argument is off the crucial point of this problem, 
since that argument ignores the role of the supernatural being. Then, 
what about the one-boxer argument? My view is that; the one-boxer 
argument is the most natural and rational as long as we accept the setting 
of Newcomb's problem as understandable, although it sounds weird in the 
sense of implying a sort of backward causation. But, how relevant is such 
my view to the present context? 
What we should notice here is that there is an obvious parallelism 
between Newcomb's problem and Humphreys' paradox. In the case of the 
original version of Humphreys' paradox, to apply B aye s' theorem and 
calculate the probability of a particular can opener's having been made by 
the machine B at 4/5 is nonsense, since the probability has already 
collapsed after your seeing the orange can opener. The same is true of 
Newcomb's paradox. To ascribe some proQability of the being's having 
made the correct prediction after your choosing either (1) or (2) must be 
nonsense. But, as to the modified version of Humphreys' paradox, 
theoretically speaking, it's perfectly reasonable to apply Bayes' theorem to 
the grasped can opener to calculate the probability of its having been made 
by machine B, since the probability hasn't yet collapsed. For the same 
reason, it's not problematic at all to talk about the probability of the correct 
prediction before your actually choosing either (1) or (2), particularly if two 
boxes are not to be seen from the outside as in the modified version of 
Humphreys' paradox. Contents of box B can't be regarded as having 
probability 1, in principle. Of course, there is a difference between two 
puzzles. In Humphreys' paradox, there is mixture of white and orange 
can openers, so actually nobody knows which can opener you grasp in the 
box. On the other hand, Newcomb's case presupposes the special being 
who himself puts nothing or $M in box B, so at least the being definitely 
(i.e . assigning probability 1) know what is in the box B. But, even though 
it is the case, the content of box B mightn't be always said to have 
probability 1, as far as we consider the temporal difficulty of probability 1. 
Strictly speaking, the same argument is applied to box A if the box A is not 
to be seen from the outside. At all events, there is nothing irrational to 
apply the concept of probability to the correctness of the being's prediction 
before your actual choice. 
However, those arguments so far concern only the theoretical aspects. 
If we practically think, the situation is changed and determinism about the 
past revives strongly. As I saw along Humphreys' paradox, we are, as it 
were fictitiously, inclined to think that the colour of the particular can 
opener has been already fixed and determined when you grasp it before 
seeing it, and in that stage determinism appears through the retroaction of 
probability in terms of backward causation according to RPH. A similar 
point will be true of Newcomb's problem. As a two-boxer argument 
unintentionally shows, we have a strong tendency to believe that, once the 
being made his prediction about your choice, the content of box B has been 
fixed and determined, so your choice has nothing to do with what is in the 
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box B. If we accept RPH, this belief could be explained by your imaginary 
representation as if you had been observing the being's prediction and the 
content of box B until now. In other words, at the time of your choice or 
your resolution to choose either (1) or (2), your fictitious representation as 
if you had seen the prediction and the content of box B CAUSES the 
probability of the correctness of the being's prediction to RETROACT to the 
past and collapse into the value 1 or O. Certainly, backward causation 
matters here, even if fictitiously. But, as I've already pointed out 
concerning Humphreys' paradox, backward causation in this context works 
in the overall formation of determinism about the past, rather than in the 
partial backward contribution of your choice to the past prediction. Thus, 
the close parallelism obtains between Humphreys' paradox and Newcomb's 
problem. In fact, if we suppose that the probability of the correctness of 
the being's prediction is 4/5 and try to choose (2) expecting $M, conditions 
of both puzzles would be exactly similar. 
Nevertheless, we mustn't overlook a big difference between them. 
That is to say, Newcomb's problem includes the existence of the being with 
supernatural power of prediction, while Humphreys' paradox doesn't 
involve such a purely fictitious element. Thus, if we consider that even 
Humphreys' paradox is actually eroded by fictitious representations about 
the past and that there is a parallelism between two puzzles, we should say 
that Newcomb's problem only makes the core of the relation between 
probability 1 and the past come to the surface more manifestly. But, 
strictly speaking, Newcomb's case sheds light on a hidden implication of 
RPH, which Humphreys' case couldn't explicitly show, by introducing the 
notion of highly probabilistic prediction of the being. What's that? 
First of all, introducing such prediction makes it possible for the 
retroactive collapse of probability through backward causation to stand out 
vividly, because the concept of prediction grammatically requires a strong 
(probably causal) connection between an action of predicting and a 
predicted thing. As far as the structure of Newcomb's problem is exactly 
similar to Humphreys' paradox, a character of Newcomb's case must be 
helpful to understand better Humphreys' case and then the problem about 
the relation between probability 1 and the past in general. Additionally, 
there is another, more noteworthy point. If we took the viewpoint of the 
being at the moment he makes a prediction and determines the content of 
box B (i.e. we needn't consider the temporal difficulty of probability 1), his 
prediction would have two implications. The first is that the prediction 
will be true with an extremely high probability, and the second is that the 
content of box B has been just fixed and determined and he would intend 
the content to remain the same until your choice, otherwise the setting of 
the problem wouldn't obtain. I want to focus my attention on the second 
point. This is nothing but taking the viewpoint to look forward back after 
looking backward. In other words, first we fictitiously causes the 
retroactive collapse of probability by looking backward, and then (of course, 
fictitiously) take the standpoint of looking forward from that past point, 
which can be drawn from the setting of Newcomb's problem through the 
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notion of prediction. It is the merit of Newcomb's problem, as far as my 
question is concerned, that such a perspective as considering the aspect of 
looking forward back is clearly introduced to RPH. 
Well, what does this perspective bring out? This perspective enables 
us to understand how determinism is extended to the future as well as the 
past. In fact, I have intentionally avoided so far mentioning the 
determinism about the future, since it sounds extremely offensive to my 
ears, although I know that the determinism is often supposed to virtually 
cover the future by being used tenselessly or timelessly. But, at least to 
me, it sounds totally implausible to use determinism without considering 
the temporal factor, for determinism usually concerns natural phenomena 
in space and time. And, more crucially, I can't imagine at all how we are 
sure of determinism applicable to any time including the future. Such 
overall determinism might be unproblematic as our ordinary belief or faith, 
but to claim it as true is absolutely beyond our capacity by definition. 
Thus, if we make the determinism about the future associated with such 
pure tenseless determinism, the situation must be completely hopeless. 
But, I think that there is another kind of the determinism about the future. 
That is the determinism which is established through the process of RPH, 
namely, such the process as we fictitiously cause the retroactive collapse of 
probability through looking backward and then look forward from that 
past point to the later time. This process is initially occasioned by the 
present representation about the past event and then retroacts to the past 
by regarding that past event as what determined this present situation, 
therefore a sort of determinism appears here. I think that this 
determinism can be said to be concerned with the future from the 
viewpoint of that past which probability retroacts to and collapses at. I 
call this determinism boomerang determinism in contrast to tenseless 
determinism. I attempt to illustrate those situations around the 
determinism about the future in the following diagram, which may be 
somehow helpful to see my point. 










In short, I claim that boomerang determinism is the only meaningful 
option as the determinism about the future , and this is clarified by 
examining Newcomb's problem. Boomerang determinism starts from a 
sort of prediction, and, as it were a prior, it is qualified to be called 
determinism, since that is defined to have been already verified by the 
present representation. In other words, the prediction is confirmed at 
present and then the prediction became the determinism in a retroactive 
way. That might sound bizarre. Yet, isn't it natural to characterize the 
determinism about the future as a sort of prediction? I think it is. And, 
probably, we also explain why people firmly believe the determinism about 
the future. That's because boomerang determinism has been always 
already verified by definition. 
However, finally, I have to strongly emphasize that those processes to 
introduce all-out determinism is thoroughly fictitious, and involved in 
backward causation which is quite unacceptable without special 
qualifications. Probability 1 that is intuitively assigned to the past event 
as expressed by PPE eventually leads to those tricky paradoxical 
situations. Of course, we always have to make commitment to those 
fictitious states. But we must also recognize the fact that those 
commitments make us involved in perplexity about the concept of 
probability. As a result, we learn a lesson. Let's apply the concept of 
probability only to the pure future without using the notion of probability 1 
and 0 at all (perhaps except the case of metaphor), and we will be exempt 
from weird complication about probability. Perhaps, on the contrary, the 
concept of causality is in principle the most appropriate tool for us to deal 
with past things, since what mostly matters concerning the past seems to 
be an ascription of origins of things and the language of causation is 
supposed to stem from our talk of attributing responsibility, whether the 
connection between cause and effect is perfectly certain or not. In a 
nutshell, it seems to me that causality leans to the past and probability 
works towards the future. But maybe, in any case, we can't actually 
restrict the concept of probability to the future . If so, all that we should 
do is to let that intrinsically paradoxical nature of probability be engraved 
on our minds when we use the concept of probability. 
*My grateful thanks are due to Professor Timothy Williamson, 
Professor Hugh MelIor, and Professor Donald Gillies for their most 
helpful comments about this article that I received when I stayed 
in Oxford, England, from 2002 to 2003 by using my sabbatical. . 
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